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Abstract
This paper investigates whether limited liability affects risk-taking through motivated beliefs.
To do so, we run a within-subject experiment in which subjects invest in a risky asset under full
or limited liability. In both cases, before the investment is made, subjects observe a noisy signal
that indicates whether the investment will succeed or fail. They then state the likelihood of the
investment’s success and decide how much to invest. Our results show a strong effect of limited
liability on both the investment decision and the formation of motivated beliefs. Compared to
subjects under full liability, subjects under limited liability not only invest larger amounts but are
also significantly more optimistic about the success of their investments. Finally, we show that
more than one-third of the increase in investment under limited liability can be explained through
motivated beliefs.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast psychological literature showing that people will distort their beliefs to reach conclusions
they want to arrive at (e.g., Hastorf and Cantril, 1954; Messick and Sentis, 1979; Kunda, 1990). Some
of the reasons behind these self-serving beliefs can be to maintain a positive self-image in the face of
some morally questionable action or to rationalize actions that conflict with one’s beliefs (Festinger,
1957). Such belief distortion not only affects many aspects of our daily life but can also have a social
impact if an entire sector of the economy or certain regulatory agencies become blind to unpleasant
realities or mounting risks (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016).
An example would be the recent financial crisis: it has been argued that one of the main causes
was excessive risk-taking (Brunnermeier, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010). Yet while some authors argue
that such behavior could come from the implicit and explicit guarantees inherent in the financial
sector (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2014), others argue that investors modified their beliefs to take larger
risks while still maintaining a positive self-image (Barberis, 2013; Be´nabou, 2015).1 If the connection
between motivated beliefs and risk-taking has the effects suggested by this latter literature, then this
connection would be a clear example of individual biases spilling over into a social phenomenon.
In this paper, we try to quantify the effects of such motivated beliefs on the risk-taking of financial
investors. To do so, we design a within-subject experiment similar to Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019) in
which the authors find experimental evidence of motivated beliefs under limited liability. To be more
precise, in our setup, subjects are given a fixed endowment to invest in a binary risky asset. Before this
decision is made, a noisy signal indicates whether the investment will succeed or fail. Subjects first
state their beliefs about the likelihood that the investment will succeed and then decide how much of
their endowment to invest in it. If the investment is successful, then the investor always receives all
the gains. If the investment fails, then the distribution of losses will depend on the treatment. In the
Baseline (BL) treatment, the investor internalizes all losses arising from her risky investments, while
in the limited liability treatments (Matched (MA) and Diffusion (DF )), such losses will be shared
with other (passive) subjects.
There are several differences between the design of Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019) and ours. First,
while Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019) run a between-subject design, we follow a within-subject design.
This allows us to compare almost identical investment opportunities under full and limited liability for
the same subject (see Section 2.1 for further details). Additionally, we introduce a new type of signal
that allows us to study beliefs with a less noisy signal than in Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019). Finally,
while Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019) stops at the detection of motivated beliefs under limited liability,
we proceed to quantify the effects that such beliefs have on the risk-taking decisions of investors.
Additionally, we are interested in studying how the “diffusion” of responsibility affects the behavior
of investors. To do so, all investors go through the two limited liability treatments mentioned above,
MA and DF. In the first case, each investor is matched to a single passive subject with whom she
shares the losses. In the second, the losses of all investors are pooled and are equally paid by all
passive subjects in the session. Based on the results of Falk and Szech (2017), Sutter et al. (2016), and
1Notice that these are not mutually exclusive reasons but are instead most likely complementary.
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Behnk et al. (2017), we hypothesize that the diffusion of responsibility across decision-makers allows
for “more room” to form motivated beliefs and therefore allows for decision-makers to self-justify
morally incorrect behavior.
Our results are straightforward. First, we replicate the observation of Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019)
that limited liability leads to investors forming motivated beliefs. For an almost identical investment
opportunity, investors form more optimistic beliefs under limited liability than under full liability.
Second, using mediator analysis (Imai et al., 2011, 2013), we are able to isolate and quantify the
causal effect that limited liability has on the investment decisions through the changes in beliefs. In
other words, we can measure how much of the change in investment, from full to limited liability, is
due to motivated beliefs. Finally, we are not able to find any effect of diffusion of responsibility in the
invested amounts under limited liability, nor on the formation of motivated beliefs.
Our study contributes to several strands of the literature. The first one is on the use of self-serving
beliefs and motivated reasoning to justify selfish actions while still maintaining a positive self-image.
Some examples are Exley (2016), who shows that individuals use risk as an excuse to give less to
charity, or Gneezy et al. (2018), who demonstrate that subjects use motivated beliefs to (self-) justify
corrupt behavior. More closely related to our study is Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019), who detect
the formation of motivated beliefs under limited liability in a similar between-subject design. In this
paper, we confirm their results in a stronger within-subject design, but most importantly, we are able
to isolate and quantify the causal effects of limited liability on investment taking, as suggested by
Barberis (2013), Be´nabou (2013), or Be´nabou (2015).
We also contribute to the literature on the diffusion of responsibility and morals in markets (Falk
and Szech, 2013; Sobel, 2007). Recent studies have shown that the diffusion of responsibilities among
several agents increases anti-social behavior (Behnk et al., 2017; Bartling et al., 2015; Falk and Szech,
2017). Contrary to their results, we find no difference in the behavior of subjects when the effects of
selfish decision are diffused across all decision-makers.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the study’s experimental design. Section 3 shows
the experiment’s results. Section 4 debates several limitations of our study, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment follows a within-subject design in which each subject participates in three different
treatments: BL, MA, and DF. Each treatment has ten rounds, and for each round, subjects receive an
endowment of e8. The subjects’ task in each round is to decide what percentage of the endowment
they want to invest in a risky asset. This asset asset yields a gain of 0.75X if the investment is
successful and yields a loss of X if the investment fails (where X ∈ [e0;e8] is the amount invested in
the risky asset).
Before each round, subjects receive a noisy signal that gives them a hint on whether the investment
will succeed or fail (see Section 2.1 for details on the signal). The three treatments differ in how the
loss is distributed among the subjects (see Section 2.2). Importantly, to avoid any hedging, at the end
of the experiment, we randomly determine which of the decisions become payoff relevant. To avoid
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learning and income effects, subjects receive no feedback on the outcomes of their decisions until the
end of the experiment. Also, to avoid for potential order effects (e.g., learning effects or treatment
spillovers), we run three orders of treatments.2
Finally, after the three treatments have occurred, subjects take part in a battery of personality elicita-
tion tasks. These include measures of cognitive ability, overestimation, overplacement, overprecision,
risk aversion, and loss aversion (see Appendix A for details on how exactly we elicit the additional
variables). Additionally, subjects also answer some demographic questions on their field of study, gen-
der, and age. After answering, subjects were finally shown a summary of the experimental outcomes
and their individual payoffs.
2.1 Signal
As previously mentioned, before each investment decision, subjects receive a noisy signal that indicates
whether the investment will succeed or fail. This signal consists of a 20x20 matrix containing red and
blue dots, and it is flashed to subjects for eight seconds (see Figure 1 for an example).
The number of red dots in Figure 1 depends on the outcome of the investment for that round. Subjects
are told that at the beginning of each round, the computer will determine with probability p = 1/2
whether the investment succeeds or not. If the investment succeeds, then the signal shown will contain
more red dots than blue dots; if the investment fails, then the signal will contain more blue dots than
red dots. Importantly, the number of red or blue dots was not the same for each period and would
range from 120 red (blue) dots to 280 red (blue) dots.
Because subjects do not have sufficient time to count the dots, they can form subjective beliefs about
the success of the investment. Immediately after seeing each matrix, subjects state their estimated
success probability of the investment and make their investment decision for the round. Hence, for
every round, we have the stated success probability of the investment and the investment decision of
each subject, conditional on the signals they saw. For more details on the exact number of red dots
shown and the ordering of the signals, see Appendix C.
2.2 Treatments
Baseline: In the BL treatment, there is no moral hazard, as each subject absorbs any profits or
losses. Therefore, subject i wins 0.75Xi if his investment is successful and loses Xi if it fails. Hence,
in BL, subject i’s payoff PBLi is given by
PBLi =
e8 + 0.75×XBLi if the investment of i is successful.e8− 1.00×XBLi if the investment of i fails. (1)
Matched: In the MA treatment, half of the subjects are randomly assigned the role of “bankers”
and the other half are “loss-takers.” Subjects are anonymously and randomly matched such that every
2These orders are 1) BL, MA, DF ; 2) MA, DF, BL; and 3) DF, MA, BL.
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Figure 1: Dot Spot
A Dot Spot with 215 red dots and 185 blue dots.
banker b ∈ {1, 2, ..., B} is associated with exactly one loss-taker t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. Subjects know their
type and that both the matches and the player types will be kept for the whole treatment.3,4
In this setup, the investment of the banker, Xb, affects the payoff of her matched loss-taker if and only
if the investment fails. So, if the investment is successful, then the banker gains 0.75Xb on top of her
initial endowment and the loss-taker gets to keep her initial endowment intact. On the other hand, if
the investment fails, then the banker loses 0.25Xb, while the loss-taker gets 0.75Xb subtracted from
her endowment for the round.
Hence in MA, the payoff of banker b for investment Xb is
PMAb =
e8 + 0.75×XMAb if the investment of b is successful.e8− 0.25×XMAb if the investment of b fails, (2)
3Subjects kept the same type across treatments, but because we kept subjects in the dark about future treatments,
they did not know this until the beginning of the following (limited liability) treatment.
4An alternative to this design would have been to make all subjects invest under all treatments and only randomly
decide at the end of the experiment which subject is a banker and who is a loss-taker. This would have provided us with
more observations. However, we decided against this design, as it possibly would have distorted our treatment effects.
For example, in this alternative design, subjects might have been more considerate of loss-takers when making their
investment decisions because they are potentially a loss-taker themselves.
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while the payoffs for loss-taker t are
PMAt =
e8 if the investment of b is successful.e8− 0.75×XMAb if the investment of b fails. (3)
Both payoffs, PMAb and P
MA
t , are explained in detail to all subjects before the start of the MA
treatment. Because the payoffs of a loss-taker t depend on the investment of her matched banker b
(see Eq. 3), all bankers are informed that their investment decisions can only have negative effects on
loss-takers.
Diffusion: In the DF treatment, the decision of each individual banker might influence the payoffs of
all loss-takers. In this case, if the banker’s investment is successful, then she gains 0.75Xb in addition
to her initial endowment of e8. Yet, if the investment fails, then the banker loses 0.25Xb and all
loss-takers evenly share the loss of 0.75Xb. Hence, the payoffs of banker b in DF is equivalent to that
in MA (see Eq. (2)), while the payoffs for loss-takers is
PDFt = e8−
0.75
T
×
B∑
b=1
(1DF
b
XDFb ), (4)
where T is the number of loss-takers in the experimental session, B is the number of bankers in the
experimental session, and 1DF
b
is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if banker b’s
investment fails and zero otherwise.
This treatment was introduced to study how the diffusion of responsibility affects the moral behavior
of bankers. Based on the results of Falk and Szech (2017), Sutter et al. (2016), and Behnk et al. (2017),
we hypothesize that the diffusion of responsibility across decision-makers allows for “more room” to
form motivated beliefs and therefore for decision-makers to self-justify morally incorrect behavior.
With this treatment, we therefore contribute to both the literature of morals and markets (Sobel,
2007; Falk and Szech, 2013) and the diffusion of responsibility (Falk and Szech, 2017).
2.3 Practice and Risk Rounds
To facilitate the understanding of the payoffs, and to get subjects acquainted with the interface before
the experiment starts, subjects participate in five practice rounds. These practice rounds are identical
to the first treatment of an experiment,5 except (i) subjects are informed that the practice rounds
have no monetary consequences and (ii) subjects receive full feedback regarding their choices.
Additionally, before each treatment starts, all subjects take part in a risky investment task. In this
task, subjects make 11 independent investment decision for 11 different assets, each of which with
a given probability of success (0%, 10%, 20%, ..., 100%). Each of these investments is independent,
and for each of them, we provide subjects with up to e8 to invest. The payoff structure is exactly
like that of the treatment (BL, MA, DF ), and the banker and loss-taker roles are maintained. Thus,
5Recall that we run three orders of treatments: 1) BL, MA, DF ; 2) MA, DF, BL; and 3) DF, MA, BL). Accordingly,
order 1 had practice rounds for BL, order 2 had practice rounds for MA, and order 3 had practice rounds for DF.
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the only difference between the risk and the treatments (BL, MA, and DF) is that with risk, bankers
know their success probabilities. Again, to avoid hedging across investments, only 1 of the 11 different
investments will count toward the final payoffs, and to avoid any wealth effects, this payoff will only
be revealed once the experiment is over.
Introducing the risk investment task not only allows us to use it as a robustness test for our instru-
mental variable (IV) approach in Section 3.3, but it also allows us to control in case subjects make
different decision under uncertainty than under risk, for example, due to ambiguity aversion. Addi-
tionally, starting each treatment with a simplified version of the task might help subjects think more
about the payoff structure and the different outcomes of that treatment.
3 Results
A total of 178 subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Of these, 58 participated in
order 1 (BL, MA, DF ), 60 in order 2 (MA, DF, BL), and 60 in order 3 (DF, MA, BL).6 Sessions lasted
roughly 130 minutes and were conducted at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the Technis-
che Universita¨t Berlin. Subjects earned, on average, e32, and the experiment was programmed and
conducted using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). For the entire results section, we only analyze the decisions
made by bankers. In addition, because we are mainly interested in investments under uncertainty, we
relegate any results of the risky investments to Appendix B, as they are qualitatively similar to the
results of investment under ambiguity described in Section 3.1.
3.1 Treatment Effects on Investment
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of the treatments (BL, MA, DF ) on the investment
levels. Because we expect subjects to care more about their own monetary payoffs than about the
payoffs of others, we hypothesize that the limited liability treatments, MA and DF, both lead to
higher investment levels than the BL treatment. To compare the two limited liability treatments, we
hypothesize that subjects invest more in the DF treatment, where the losses of an investment are
distributed among many loss-takers. For a selfish banker (i.e., one that only cares about her own
monetary payoffs), the two limited liability treatments provide exactly the same incentives. However,
we hypothesize in Section 2.2 that bankers might invest more if the concerns for the agents covering
the losses get diluted so that an individual loss-taker is not heavily affected by the individual banker’s
decision.
In Figure 2, we present the bankers’ investments for each of the three treatments for each observed
hint. The vertical axis illustrates the investment made by bankers as a percentage share of their
endowment, while the horizontal axis represents the number of red dots shown in the matrix. The box
plots show that the more red dots a matrix has, the more bankers invested in the asset, suggesting
that the variations in the number of red dots carry informational content and influence the bankers’
decisions.
6We ran nine sessions in total. Eight sessions had 20 subjects and thus had 10 loss-takers and 10 bankers. The ninth
session only had 18 subjects (9 bankers and 9 loss-takers) due to subjects not showing up to the session.
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Figure 2: Investments for Given Numbers of Red Dots
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Investments made by bankers. The vertical axis represents the investment made as a percentage of the endowment. The
horizontal axis shows the number of red dots in a Dot Spot. For each number of red dots, we show a box plot for every
treatment (BL, MA, DF ).
Figure 2 also points toward bankers investing more under limited liability (MA and DF ) than in the
BL treatment. This is confirmed in Table 1, where we present the mean investments across treatments;
while bankers invest, on average, only 27.9% of their endowment in the BL treatment, in the limited
liability cases, they invest 41.4% and 39.3% in MA and DF, respectively.
To better understand the differences across treatments, in Table 2 we present the results of within-
subject Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, comparing investments across treatments and hints.7 The p-
values of the within-subject Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the total amount invested in the
treatments (first column on the left) clearly indicate that there are significant investment differences
between MA and BL as well as between DF and BL (p-value < 0.001 in both cases). Also, while we
observe substantial effects of limited liability compared to the BL treatment, there are no significant
7Recall from Section 2.1 that for each treatment (BL, MA, DF ), a banker might see, up to two times, an image
with the same number of dots. For example, a banker might see a Dot Spot with 195 red dots twice in BL, never in
MA, and once in DF. In this case, for the Dot Spot with 195 red dots, this banker’s data would neither be used for
the comparisons between MA and BL nor for the comparisons between MA and DF. In the case a subject sees twice
an image in the same treatment for a given number of red dots, we take the average between both investments for the
comparison with the other treatment(s).
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Table 1: Mean Investments for Dot Spots
Total 120 185 190 195 199 201 205 210 215 280
BL 27.88 2.64 9.03 15.94 21.75 20.72 33.82 33.52 29.55 39.85 89.59
(36.30) (14.05) (19.40) (26.22) (30.31) (28.82) (37.33) (36.59) (33.05) (37.13) (21.95)
MA 41.44 4.73 21.02 27.28 36.16 32.95 41.93 47.43 49.29 61.37 88.47
(38.80) (17.28) (29.86) (33.29) (39.13) (33.79) (36.01) (34.91) (35.26) (35.12) (21.23)
DF 39.27 2.82 13.36 28.88 27.54 21.66 53.07 41.55 51.75 61.85 91.40
(38.41) (12.06) (22.13) (28.34) (29.80) (27.17) (35.11) (35.64) (37.32) (36.81) (19.84)
Mean investments as a percentage share of the endowment. The column Total shows the aggregated average of all
investments in a treatment. The other columns show the average investment for a given number of red dots in the Dot
Spot. Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses.
Table 2: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests for Dot Spots
Total 120 180 190 195 199 201 205 210 215 280
p-value BL = MA <0.001 0.406 0.001 0.032 0.052 0.009 0.027 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.305
p-value BL = DF <0.001 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.166 0.043 <0.001 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 0.075
p-value DF = MA 0.286 0.993 0.543 0.713 0.455 0.632 0.343 0.520 0.392 0.288 0.220
The p-values comparing (paired) investments across treatments. We compare the aggregate investment for the same
banker for the subset of similar Dot Spots (i.e., Dot Spots with the same number of red dots) that the banker sees
in both treatments that are being compared. Note that, unlike in Table 1 and Figure 2, we thus only use a subset of
banker data in Table 2.
differences between the MA and DF treatments. This is confirmed by comparing the total amounts
invested in MA and DF (p-value = 0.286).
Overall, when studying the effects of our different treatments, we find two clear results. First, the
limited liability treatments have a significant positive effect on the level of risk-taking of bankers.
Second, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the investment levels in MA and DF are the same.
We can thus summarize the results of Section 3.1 in Result 1:
Result 1 Treatment Effects on Investment
i) The investments in the limited liability treatments, MA and DF, are both significantly larger than
in the BL treatment.
ii) The investment levels in both limited liability treatments are similar, and we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there are no differences in investment levels between MA and DF.
3.2 Treatment Effect on Beliefs
This subsection studies the effects of limited liability on the beliefs of bankers. Figure 3 plots the
stated success probabilities of bankers for each Dot Spot type of matrix and for each treatment. The
first thing to notice is that the signal is hard to interpret. As we can see, even if there is a slight
upward trend, for most of the matrices, bankers report values close to the prior (50% probability of
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success) and only strongly deviate from the prior in the most extreme cases (120 and 280 red dots).
Interestingly, it is only when the Dot Spots show more than 200 red dots that the median subject
reports a success probability of 50% or more; before that, the median expected success is below 50%.
Figure 3: Stated success probabilities for Given Numbers of Red Dots
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Stated success probabilities made by bankers. The vertical axis represents the subjective likelihood taht the investment
will be successful as a probability between 0 and 100. The horizontal axis shows the number of red dots in a Dot Spot
shown. For each number of red dots, we show a box plot for every treatment (BL, MA, DF ). The red horizontal line
marks the 50% probability of success.
Yet, when comparing the stated probabilities for each Dot Spot across treatments using a Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests, we do not see any significant differences. As in Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa (2019), the
differences in beliefs appear once we pool the data to run regressions. In columns (1) to (3) of Table
3, we use our balanced panel of 89 bankers and 30 rounds to regress the estimated success probability
of bankers (Prob) on a dummy variable for the different treatments (MA and DF ), a dummy for the
number of dots in each matrix, and all of the personality and order controls.
The results show that the variation in the number of red dots has a large impact on the beliefs:
for example, the perceived success probabilities in specification (3) are, on average, 32.9 percentage
points larger for a matrix with 195 red dots (195.dots) than for a matrix with 120 red dots. But most
importantly, in all specifications the treatment variables MA and DF are statistically significant and
positive. This indicates that in both limited liability treatments, bankers are more optimistic about
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the success of their investments.
The difference between columns (1) and (2) is that in the second, we include the personality controls
described in Appendix A. Interestingly, none of the controls has any explanatory power, so we omit
them from the table. The difference between columns (2) and (3) is the inclusion of a dummy for gender.
Because in one session we did not record the gender of subjects, column (3) has less observations than
columns (1) and (2).
In column (4), we only use the data for moral hazard treatments (MA and DF ) to test for any
differences in the formation of motivated beliefs. As in Tables 1 and 2, there is no difference between
both treatments, as DF is not significantly different from zero.
Result 2 Treatment Effects on Beliefs
i) The subjective success probability of investments in the limited liability treatments, MA and DF,
are both significantly larger than in the BL treatment.
ii) The subjective success probability of investments in both limited liability treatments are similar, and
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences in investment levels between MA and
DF.
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Dep. Variable: Prob (1) (2) (3) (4)
MA 4.031∗∗∗ 4.034∗∗∗ 3.971∗∗∗
(1.112) (1.113) (1.194)
DF 2.703∗∗ 2.705∗∗ 3.070∗∗ -0.917
(1.096) (1.097) (1.191) (1.230)
185.dots 19.05∗∗∗ 19.06∗∗∗ 19.30∗∗∗ 21.60∗∗∗
(1.918) (1.935) (2.029) (2.396)
190.dots 29.16∗∗∗ 29.08∗∗∗ 27.94∗∗∗ 27.61∗∗∗
(2.159) (2.161) (2.303) (2.400)
195.dots 32.18∗∗∗ 32.12∗∗∗ 32.97∗∗∗ 34.86∗∗∗
(2.449) (2.477) (2.615) (2.795)
199.dots 32.69∗∗∗ 32.66∗∗∗ 31.02∗∗∗ 32.88∗∗∗
(2.463) (2.448) (2.486) (2.688)
201.dots 44.19∗∗∗ 44.12∗∗∗ 42.34∗∗∗ 43.30∗∗∗
(2.654) (2.656) (2.742) (2.936)
205.dots 40.92∗∗∗ 40.87∗∗∗ 40.16∗∗∗ 41.48∗∗∗
(2.383) (2.391) (2.594) (3.083)
210.dots 44.28∗∗∗ 44.25∗∗∗ 43.55∗∗∗ 47.11∗∗∗
(2.635) (2.653) (2.828) (2.995)
215.dots 53.28∗∗∗ 53.16∗∗∗ 50.66∗∗∗ 53.56∗∗∗
(2.954) (2.957) (3.091) (3.291)
280.dots 80.78∗∗∗ 80.66∗∗∗ 79.14∗∗∗ 79.11∗∗∗
(2.723) (2.743) (3.002) (3.067)
Constant 7.150∗∗∗ 13.17 5.657 9.856
(1.989) (13.49) (13.57) (13.51)
N 2670 2670 2400 1600
adj. R2 0.436 0.437 0.437 0.455
Number of Investors 89 89 80 80
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes Yes
Baseline Included Yes Yes Yes No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: In the first three columns we study the effects of the different signals and moral hazard
treatments on the estimated probability made by each investor. In the fourth column we use only
the data for the moral hazard treatments. Robust standard errors clustered at the investor level in
parentheses.
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3.3 Quantifying the Effects of Motivated Beliefs
In this subsection, we investigate whether limited liability affects risk-taking through motivated beliefs.
To do so, we use “causal mediation analysis,” which tries to go beyond establishing whether there
is a causal link between treatment and outcome and aims to identify the causal mechanism behind
such a link. In Section 3.1, we show that bankers invest significantly more under limited liability, yet
this does not necessarily imply that limited liability affects investments only through beliefs (e.g., the
changes in incentives might also have a large impact on subjects). Therefore, to disentangle motivated
beliefs from all other effects that limited liability might have on decision-makers, we follow Imai et al.
(2011) and Imai et al. (2013). In these two papers, the authors show that an IV approach can be
used to disentangle the effects of our mediator of interest (i.e., motivated beliefs) from all other effects
of the treatment (i.e., the presence of limited liability). To see how this disentanglement works, first
consider an incomplete benchmark IV regression:
Probb,r = γ0 + γ1 × Treatmentb,r + ρb,r, (5)
Investmentb,r = δ0 + δ1 × P̂ robb,r + µb,r. (6)
Probb,r captures banker b’s belief about the success probability of an investment in round r.
Treatmentb,r is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the limited liability treatments
MA and DF and zero if the treatment is BL.8 Finally, Investmentb,r captures what percentage of
the endowment banker b invests into the risky asset. Thus, while the first stage in Eq. (5) regresses
the beliefs of bankers on the treatment, the second stage (Eq. (6)) regresses the investment on the
estimated beliefs.
As can be seen from these two equations, this specification assumes that the treatment impacts
investments only through beliefs. Yet, if the treatment also happens to have a direct impact on
investments, as is likely in our setup (think of the change in incentives), then the exclusion restriction
is violated and the model is misspecified.
Therefore, to isolate the effect of motivated beliefs on investment, we need to disentangle the effect of
limited liability that works only through beliefs (henceforth the “indirect effect”) from all other effects
of our treatment (henceforth the “direct effects”). To do so, we introduce the variable Dotsb,r, which
comprises dummies for the ten different numbers of red dots that we use for the Dot Spots (recall
Table 9 in Section 2.1), into the first stage. This secondary source of exogenous variation in beliefs
basically reconstructs the regression in Table 3 and allows us to then run the following IV regression:
Probb,r = α0 + α1 × Treatmentb,r + α2 ×Dotsb,r + b,r, (7)
Investmentb,r = β0 + β1 × P̂ robb,r + β2 × Treatmentb,r + ub,r. (8)
8Because the two limited liability treatments are statistically indistinguishable (recall Result 1 and Result 2), we
pool them together for our mediator analysis. For a disaggregated analysis of the results for each treatment (MA and
DF ), see Appendix D.1.
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The advantage of this model is that we can identify the effect of beliefs on investments by exploiting
the variation in Dotsb,r (instead of solely exploiting variation in beliefs due to Treatmentb,r). This
feature allows us to include Treatmentb,r as an explanatory variable in the second stage, which enables
us to isolate the effect that limited liability has on beliefs from all other effects. Our main assumption
to do so is that the number of red dots, Dotsb,r, affects the investment decision through a shift in
subjects’ beliefs.
We can now simply compute the complier average mediation effect (CACME) as the product of α1
from Eq. (7) and β1 from Eq. (8). This is the average effect of limited liability on investment that is
mediated by beliefs among those bankers whose beliefs are affected by limited liability (see, e.g., Imai
et al., 2011).9 In contrast, the complier average direct treatment effect (CADE) captures all causal
mechanisms of limited liability on investment that do not work through the beliefs and is simply given
by β2 in Eq. (8).
Table 4 shows the results from the first stage (Eq. (7)) for the three different specifications. The results
show that the variation in the number of red dots has a large impact on the beliefs: for example, the
perceived success probabilities in specification (3) are, on average, 31.7 percentage points larger for
a matrix with 195 red dots (Dots 195 ) than for a matrix with 120 red dots. But most importantly,
in all four specifications of Table 4, the variable Treatment is statistically significant and positive.
This finding indicates that, under limited liability, bankers increase their beliefs on the success of an
investment by roughly 3.3 percentage points.
Table 5 presents the second-stage results for the same three specifications as in Table 4. On average,
an increase in the perceived success probabilities by 1 percentage point increases the investment by
approximately 1.1 percentage points in all three specifications. This effect is statistically significant
at the 1% level. In specification (2), the CADE (i.e., β2 in Eq. (8)) is approximately 6.97 percentage
points. As a robustness check for these results, in Appendix D.2, we use different specifications to
analyze the effects of beliefs on the investment decisions of bankers. The results corroborate the
validity of our IV approach.
Finally, using the first- and second-stage results from Tables 4 and 5, we obtain the CACME, which
is 3.367× 1.092 ≈ 3.675 in specification (2). In Table 6, we use bootstrapped standard errors to test
whether the effect of limited liability through the beliefs, α1 × β1, is statistically significant. We find
that this effect of motivated beliefs is statistically significant at the 1% level in all three specifications.
Overall, our analysis in Tables 4–6 indicates that limited liability has a large impact on the formation
of motivated beliefs and such beliefs are responsible for over one-third of the increase in investment
under limited liability.
Result 3 Quantitative Effects of Motivated Beliefs on Investment
On average, motivated beliefs are responsible for over one-third of the increase in investment under
limited liability.
9The concept of the CACME is thus similar to the local average treatment effect obtained from standard IV estima-
tions.
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Dep. Variable: Prob (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 3.368∗∗∗ 3.367∗∗∗ 3.517∗∗∗
(0.942) (0.942) (1.019)
185.dots 19.02∗∗∗ 19.05∗∗∗ 19.38∗∗∗
(1.920) (1.941) (2.055)
190.dots 29.18∗∗∗ 29.07∗∗∗ 27.93∗∗∗
(2.157) (2.171) (2.323)
195.dots 32.14∗∗∗ 32.11∗∗∗ 32.98∗∗∗
(2.452) (2.468) (2.588)
199.dots 32.71∗∗∗ 32.63∗∗∗ 30.98∗∗∗
(2.460) (2.449) (2.483)
201.dots 44.19∗∗∗ 44.20∗∗∗ 42.46∗∗∗
(2.653) (2.662) (2.740)
205.dots 40.96∗∗∗ 40.93∗∗∗ 40.24∗∗∗
(2.383) (2.376) (2.584)
210.dots 44.27∗∗∗ 44.30∗∗∗ 43.65∗∗∗
(2.636) (2.632) (2.792)
215.dots 53.31∗∗∗ 53.22∗∗∗ 50.68∗∗∗
(2.950) (2.945) (3.053)
280.dots 80.79∗∗∗ 80.72∗∗∗ 79.25∗∗∗
(2.721) (2.730) (2.988)
Constant 7.145∗∗∗ 16.28 15.36
(1.986) (11.12) (10.34)
Observations 2670 2670 2400
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
adj. R2 0.436 0.437 0.438
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: First Stage Regressions for Prob. In all four columns the dummy for Dots120 is not included
because of multicollinearity. Robust standard errors clustered at the investor level in parentheses.
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Dep. Variable: Investment (1) (2) (3)
Treatment 6.971∗∗∗ 6.970∗∗∗ 7.257∗∗∗
(1.344) (1.341) (1.460)
Prob (instrumented) 1.091∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.106∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050)
Constant -19.18∗∗∗ -39.25∗ -41.11∗
(2.176) (20.94) (22.87)
N 2670 2670 2400
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
adj. R2 0.351 0.365 0.358
Gender No No Yes
Controls No Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Second Stage with Instruments for Prob. Robust standard errors clustered at the investor
level in parentheses.
Dep. Variable: Investment (1) (2) (3)
Indirect Treatment Effect (CACME) 3.675∗∗∗ 3.675∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗
(1.038) (1.059) (1.110)
Direct Treatment Effects (CADE) 6.971∗∗∗ 6.970∗∗∗ 7.257∗∗∗
(1.403) (1.325) (1.508)
Observations 2670 2670 2400
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
Gender No No Yes
Controls for Treatment Order No Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Indirect (CACME) and Direct Treatment Effects (CADE). Standard errors obtained from
bootstrapping by resampling observations (with replacements) for 1,000 times. Bootstrap standard
errors in parentheses.
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4 Discussion
Experimental and quasi-experimental studies are often criticized for only focusing on the causal effect
of a treatment on an outcome without explaining how and why it actually affects the outcome (e.g.,
Deaton, 2010; Heckman and Smith, 1995), yet the empirical identification of causal mediator effects
is often challenging.10 Randomization of the treatment alone is not sufficient to uncover the causal
mediator effect, as it cannot disentangle the direct treatment effects from the treatment effects through
the mediator. Using an additional source of variation (i.e., Dot Spots) in our mediator (i.e., beliefs),
our design aims to avoid confounding the causal mediator effect.
However, our empirical identification and design also entails certain limitations. First, our regression
specification, Eqs. (7) and (8), assumes a linear functional form. We will aim to address this con-
cern in future versions of this project by non-parametrically estimating the average causal mediation
effect, as in Imai et al. (2010). Second, while we incentivize the outcomes, we do not incentivize
the beliefs of banker subjects.11 While this might lead to experimenter demand effects, we opted to
leave out incentives, as it would add yet another layer of complication to an already long experiment.
Third, incentivizing beliefs could potentially counteract the intrinsic incentives that are responsible
for motivated beliefs.12
Another potential limitation of our project is external validity. Our subject pool mainly consists of
students who may or may not behave differently than financial employees. In a meta study, Fre´chette
(2011) finds that there are some instances in which student subjects and professionals show behavioral
differences, but these differences are small, provided that the two populations are playing the same
game. Additionally, Cornand and Heinemann (2019) argue that the qualitative results of laboratory
experiments might carry more external validity than, for example, results based only on numerical
simulations. Hence, while the external validity of an experiment with financial employees would be
higher, we still expect our analysis to be informative. Another concern related to external validity is
that we would ideally investigate decision-making in real financial markets. However, unlike observa-
tional data, the laboratory setting enables us to vary the limited liability incentives within-subject, to
control the information that subjects receive regarding the success probabilities of investments, and
to elicit individual beliefs.
The finding that motivated beliefs contribute to risk-taking under limited liability raises the question
of how policy could affect them. In general, research has shown that debiasing motivated beliefs is
difficult. Even experienced professionals (e.g., teachers, lawyers, and judges) are prone to self-serving
biases (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Eisenberg, 1994), and simply informing individuals about the
existence of self-serving biases is an ineffectual debiasing tool (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). Nev-
ertheless, there have been some successful attempts at debiasing motivated beliefs. It has been shown
that self-serving assessments are mitigated when subjects make judgments before they receive infor-
10See Imai et al. (2011, 2013) for the difficulties associated with uncovering causal mechanisms.
11See Schlag et al. (2015) for a discussion of the trade-offs related to the usage of incentives for belief elicitation in
experiments.
12Notice, however, that in a recent paper, Engelmann et al. (2019) study the effects of incentives on the formation of
motivated beliefs and find no changes in beliefs across their different incentives.
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mation regarding their incentives (Gneezy et al., 2016, 2018). Motivated beliefs and its consequences
are also reduced by a more objective decision environment (Gneezy et al., 2018). Finally, Babcock
et al. (1997) show that instructing subjects to question their own assessment by thinking about the
weaknesses and counterarguments to their judgment mitigates self-serving biases substantially.
For policymakers who aim to reduce risk-taking under limited liability, it might thus be beneficial to
force material risk-takers in the financial sector to more strongly rationalize their investment behavior
based on objective and hard facts of the investment target or to make them justify in much detail why
a potential investment could go wrong and who would suffer from it. However, all these treatments
might lead to other distortions, and their effectiveness in a financial context has not yet been tested.
5 Conclusion
Gino et al. (2016) describe “motivated Bayesians” as those persons who bias, manipulate, or ignore
information to self-justify immoral behavior. Some examples might be people who do not sort waste
“because it is useless” (Piermatte´o and Monaco, 2015) or parents who convince themselves that “it
is not so cold outside” to avoid the struggle of putting a snowsuit on their young child. Indeed, self-
serving beliefs are widely documented in the literature and have been shown to have effects on many
different aspects of economic decision-making (e.g., Haisley and Weber, 2010; Ahrens and Bosch-Rosa,
2019; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 2016), yet to our knowledge, we are the first to document
and quantify the effects of motivated beliefs on risk-taking when limited liability is present.
We set up a within-subject experimental design where subjects make investments both under full
and limited liability. These investments are preceded by a noisy signal that indicates whether the
investment will succeed or fail. We exploit the variance in the noisy signal to use mediator analysis and
disentangle the effect of limited liability that works through motivated beliefs from all other investment
effects of limited liability. Our key result is that, for a given signal, subjects assign higher probabilities
of success under limited liability than in the full liability treatment, resulting in a significant increase
in risk-taking. This result confirms the theoretical predictions of Barberis (2013) and Be´nabou (2015),
who point toward motivated beliefs as important contributors to the recent financial crisis.
In Barberis (2013), the author points toward subprime securitization as an especially ripe area for
motivated beliefs and excessive risk-taking. The reason is that subprime-linked products were so
complex that they offered enough “belief wiggle room” for traders at banks’ mortgage desks to easily
manipulate their beliefs and justify their excessive risk-taking. Gino et al. (2016) argue that the
formation of motivated beliefs depends critically on whether “the context provides sufficient flexibility
to allow plausible justification that one can both act egoistically while remaining moral.” In this
experiment, we show that even a little bit of ambiguity is enough to trigger such self-serving beliefs.
This has important implications for policymakers, as it shows that they must target not only bad
incentives but also target “bad beliefs.” How to do so effectively is an important question for future
research.
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A Additional Variables
After the three treatments, subjects participate in a final block of 5 parts, which we use to elicit
additional variables. In the first part, all subjects take a Raven test, which measures the participants’
reasoning abilities. In this test, a subject is given eight graphical elements and must choose the missing
ninth elements, which completes the pattern (see Figure 8 in Appendix E for an example). The test
consists of three sets of twelve items each, and subjects are given 5 minutes per set. For each correctly
answered item participants receive e0.10.
In part 2, subjects are asked two questions about their performance in the Raven test, which determine
overestimation and overplacement, respectively. In the first question, we ask subjects how many of
the 36 items in the Raven test they have answered correctly. The difference between this estimated
number of correct answers, EOEi, and the actual number of correct answers in the Raven test, AOEi,
gives us the level of overestimation of subject i, OEi.
In the second question of part 2, each subject is asked how many participants in their own experimental
session have answered less Raven questions correctly than they did, EOPLi. The difference between
EOPLi and the actual number of subjects that performed worse than subject i, AOPLi, determines
the overplacement of subject i, OPLi.
The computer randomly chooses one of the two questions of part 2 to become payoff relevant. If
the first question is chosen, the subject receives POEi = max{e2− e0.15× |EOEi −AOEi|;e0}.
In case the second question is selected, the payoff for subject i is given by POPLi =
max{e2− e0.15× |EOPLi −AOPLi|;e0}. Hence the more accurately the subject estimates her
performance and relative performance in the Raven test, the higher is her expected payoff.
Part 3 elicits overprecision. It consists of 10 rounds and it is based on the method introduced in
Ahrens et al. (2019). Before each round, subjects are shown a new Dot Spot containing a total of 400
red and blue dots. After seeing the graph, subjects answer the two questions shown in Figure 4. In
Figure 4: Overprecision Questions
the first question, subjects give an estimate Ni,r of the number of red dots shown in round r. In the
second question, subjects state their expected error, EEi,r. This expected error is subject i’s expected
absolute distance between his estimate of the number of red dots Ni,r and the actual number of red
dots in the graphic, Ai,r.
For round r, we define overprecision as the difference between a subject’s stated expected error EEi,r
and his actual error, AEi,r. Hence the overprecision of subject i in round r is given by OPi,r =
AEi,r–EEi,r where AEi,r = |Ai,r − Ni,r|. We define the overprecision of a subject i, OPi, as the
median value of the ten OPi,r values that we collect for each individual i. A subject is overprecise if
OPi > 0 (i.e., when her actual error is larger than her expected error) and underprecise if OPi < 0.
21
The computer randomly chooses only one of the ten rounds and only one of the two questions for
a subject’s payoff in part 3. If the first question of round r is paid off, then the subject receives
POP1i,r = max{e5− e0.05×AEi,r;e0}. If the second question becomes payoff relevant, then the
subject obtains POP2i,r = max{e5− e0.05× |AEi,r–EEi,r|;e0}. Hence the subject’s payoff for both
questions in part 3 is higher, the closer are the answers of the subject to the correct answers. Part
4 of the final block elicits risk and loss aversion using multiple price lists (see Tables 23 and 24 in
Appendix E). In part 5, subjects state their field of study, age, and gender.
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B Risk
Figure 5: Investments for Given Probabilities in Risk Part
Screenshot of the Risky Investment round. Each row presents subjects with a certain probability of a successful invest-
ment. For each row subjects have an e8 endowment and can decide what percentage of it to invest in the asset using
the scroll bar. The payoffs will be those of they are in (BL, MA, DF ).
In the Risk part, the success probabilities of all investments are objectively given. Figure 6 shows
the investments as a percentage share of the endowment (vertical axis) for a given exogenous success
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Figure 6: Investments for Given Probabilities in Risk Part
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Investments made by bankers in the Risk part. The vertical axis represents the investment made as a percentage of the
endowment. The horizontal axis shows the given success probabilities. For each success probability, we show a box plot
for every treatment (BL, MA, DF ).
probability (horizontal axis). Overall, the box plots in Figure 6 indicate that bankers understood the
incentives, as they tend to invest more for higher success probabilities.
Figure 6, as well as the means reported in Table 7, show that subjects invest significantly more in
the limited liability treatments than in the Baseline. On average, subjects invest 31.7 (BL), 40.6
(MA), and 41.5 (DF ) percent of their endowment. In line with this, the investment in the limited
liability treatments are also higher for most success probabilities. Exceptions only arise for the extreme
probabilities (0% and 100%) where – independent of the treatment – bankers tend to invest either
nothing or their whole endowment. Finally, we present a within-subject Wilcoxon signed-rank test
comparing the total investments made in the three treatments (Table 8) which confirms that the
investments in both MA and DF are significantly higher than in BL (p-value < 0.001 in both cases).
While we observe substantial effects of the limited liability treatments compared to the Baseline,
there are no significant differences between the two limited liability treatments, MA and DF. Not
only are the total investment levels in these treatments similar, but also the investments for a given
success probability (Table 7). A within-subject Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the total amount
invested in both treatments confirms this picture, as the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be
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Table 7: Mean Investments in Risk Part
Total 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
BL 31.69 0.83 1.94 3.29 5.08 8.56 17.30 30.13 45.46 62.83 76.43 96.74
(37.98) (6.03) (7.83) (10.18) (12.99) (14.86) (20.48) (25.61) (29.27) (29.40) (27.64) (16.16)
MA 40.56 0.69 3.94 5.69 9.94 19.43 36.21 49.26 61.73 75.49 86.42 97.37
(38.95) (5.85) (10.54) (11.92) (16.00) (24.30) (26.88) (26.33) (25.13) (19.54) (18.24) (14.12)
DF 41.50 0.74 2.92 5.39 12.08 21.13 39.70 51.21 63.36 75.74 86.82 97.43
(39.15) (5.93) (7.79) (10.80) (16.96) (23.98) (27.79) (26.46) (25.25) (23.06) (17.64) (14.00)
Mean investments as a percentage share of the endowment for the Risk part. The column Total shows the aggregated
average of all investments in a treatment. The other columns show the average investment for a given success probability
of the investment. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Table 8: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests for Risk Part
Total 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
p-value BL = MA <0.001 0.554 0.034 0.020 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.320
p-value BL = DF <0.001 0.1573 0.071 0.012 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.105
p-value DF = MA 0.431 0.993 0.543 0.7133 0.455 0.632 0.343 0.520 0.392 0.288 0.220 0.186
The p-values of the within-subject Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing (paired) investments in the Risk part across
treatments. The Total column compares the total amount invested in the treatments. The other columns compare the
investments for given exogenous probabilities in the treatments.
rejected (p-value = 0.431).
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C Dot Spot details
As mentioned in Section 2.1, before each round the computer determines whether the investment will
succeed or fail. If it succeeds, then the matrix shown to subjects will have more red than blue dots,
if the investment fails, then the matrix shown to subjects will have more blue than red dots. The
number of dots shown for each round in all three treatments can be found in Table 9. 13
Two things are important to notice. First, the number of red dots shown are based on data from
pilots. Except for the two extremes (120 and 280 red dots), the number of red dots shown are thought
to convey some information about the success probability of the investment, while still being noisy
enough to create uncertainty over the outcome. Second, in each pair the matrices are mirror images of
each other. We do this to hold constant the level of difficulty in reading a signal within each pair. This
is important as we use the effects that the variation in the number of red dots have on the beliefs of
subjects to identify the effects of motivated beliefs on risk-taking under limited liability (see Section
3.3).
Finally, notice that the number of dots shown is repeated within and across treatments. This means
that a subject might see more than once a matrix with the same number of red dots (e.g., a matrix
with 120 red dots can potentially be seen in rounds 5 and 9 of BL, rounds 6 and 8 of MA, and rounds
2 and 8 of DF). Yet, while these matrices have the same number of dots, they each differ in the pattern
of the dots. See for an example Figure 7, in it we show two “similar” matrices each containing 215 red
dots. Having these “similar” matrices with the same number of red dots but with different patterns
enables us to compare identically informative signals across treatments, while preventing subjects from
learning from (or anchoring to) previously shown signals.
Table 9: Red Dots Shown in Each Round
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
BL
Success: 205 215 201 201 280 210 215 210 280 205
Fail: 195 185 199 199 120 190 185 190 120 195
MA
Success: 210 205 215 210 201 280 201 280 215 205
Fail 190 195 185 190 199 120 199 120 185 195
DF
Success: 210 280 201 210 205 215 215 280 205 201
Fail: 190 120 199 190 195 199 155 120 195 199
Number of red dots shown for each round and treatment depending on the outcome of the investment.
13The sequences were picked by taking the first three number sequences generated using the web page
www.random.org.
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Figure 7: Two “Similar” Matrices
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Two “similar” matrices with 215 red dots each, but a different dot pattern.
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D Robustness checks of the IV
D.1 Disaggregating the treatments in the IV approach
In this section we report the results of the instrumental variable approach of Section 3.3 for each
of the two limited liability treatments (MA and DF ). In Tables 10 and 11 we run the first stage
regression (eq. 7) for treatments MA and DF respectively. The results are practically identical, with
the coefficient for the MA treatment being slightly higher than for the DF treatment.14 Overall, we
observe no differences in the first stage across treatments and the results are in the order of magnitude
of those in Table 4.
Tables 12 and 12 show the second stage (eq. 8). Again we see that the results are similar to those
in Table 5, as the differences between treatments are minimal. Because of the similar results in both
first and second stage, the CACME and CADE for the MA and DF treatments (Tables 14 and 15,
respectively) are very similar to those of the pooled data (Table 6).
14The significance of the treatment effect for DF , when not controlling for gender, is above the 1% threshold. Yet, as
can be seen from the SE, it is very close to it (p-value=0.013).
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Dep. Variable: Prob (1) (2) (3)
Treatment (MA) 4.065∗∗∗ 4.061∗∗∗ 3.990∗∗∗
(1.112) (1.113) (1.198)
185.dots 19.87∗∗∗ 19.87∗∗∗ 19.92∗∗∗
(2.175) (2.175) (2.191)
190.dots 27.49∗∗∗ 27.49∗∗∗ 26.78∗∗∗
(2.383) (2.380) (2.539)
195.dots 33.45∗∗∗ 33.50∗∗∗ 33.93∗∗∗
(2.679) (2.718) (2.847)
199.dots 33.22∗∗∗ 33.13∗∗∗ 30.93∗∗∗
(2.704) (2.701) (2.632)
201.dots 43.21∗∗∗ 43.36∗∗∗ 41.46∗∗∗
(2.992) (3.003) (3.032)
205.dots 41.02∗∗∗ 41.04∗∗∗ 40.44∗∗∗
(2.405) (2.399) (2.584)
210.dots 42.55∗∗∗ 42.63∗∗∗ 42.03∗∗∗
(2.953) (2.943) (3.054)
215.dots 52.21∗∗∗ 52.28∗∗∗ 49.45∗∗∗
(3.110) (3.118) (3.115)
280.dots 80.52∗∗∗ 80.60∗∗∗ 79.29∗∗∗
(2.723) (2.748) (2.984)
Constant 7.452∗∗∗ 11.37 11.00
(1.922) (12.22) (11.05)
Observations 1780 1780 1600
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
adj. R2 0.419 0.420 0.423
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: First Stage Regressions for Prob us-
ing BL and MA data. In all three columns the
dummy for Dots120 is not included because of
multicollinearity. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the investor level in parentheses.
Dep. Variable: Prob (1) (2) (3)
Treatment (DF) 2.762∗∗ 2.752∗∗ 3.139∗∗∗
(1.086) (1.087) (1.180)
185.dots 16.59∗∗∗ 16.69∗∗∗ 16.68∗∗∗
(2.393) (2.429) (2.605)
190.dots 30.77∗∗∗ 30.68∗∗∗ 29.38∗∗∗
(2.575) (2.590) (2.797)
195.dots 29.45∗∗∗ 29.57∗∗∗ 30.38∗∗∗
(2.914) (2.922) (3.163)
199.dots 30.78∗∗∗ 30.67∗∗∗ 29.02∗∗∗
(2.681) (2.710) (2.828)
201.dots 44.44∗∗∗ 44.58∗∗∗ 42.76∗∗∗
(2.956) (2.971) (3.095)
205.dots 39.13∗∗∗ 39.05∗∗∗ 38.70∗∗∗
(2.724) (2.712) (2.925)
210.dots 41.98∗∗∗ 42.10∗∗∗ 41.59∗∗∗
(2.872) (2.858) (3.066)
215.dots 51.62∗∗∗ 51.56∗∗∗ 49.08∗∗∗
(3.270) (3.234) (3.403)
280.dots 81.09∗∗∗ 81.13∗∗∗ 79.45∗∗∗
(2.923) (2.977) (3.270)
Constant 8.196∗∗∗ 15.63 13.26
(2.175) (11.80) (11.96)
Observations 1780 1780 1600
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
adj. R2 0.436 0.438 0.437
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: First Stage Regressions for Prob us-
ing BL and DF data. In all three columns the
dummy for Dots120 is not included because of
multicollinearity. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the investor level in parentheses.
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Dep. Variable: Invest (1) (2) (3)
Treatment (MA) 7.212∗∗∗ 7.200∗∗∗ 7.899∗∗∗
(1.593) (1.593) (1.705)
Prob (instrumented) 1.058∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗
(0.0478) (0.0485) (0.0532)
Constant -17.75∗∗∗ -25.88 -29.12
(2.219) (20.87) (21.94)
N 1780 1780 1600
adj. R2 0.332 0.343 0.337
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Second Stage with Instruments for
Prob using BL and MA data. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the investor level in
parentheses.
Dep. Variable: Invest (1) (2) (3)
Treatment (DF) 6.878∗∗∗ 6.876∗∗∗ 6.755∗∗∗
(1.397) (1.397) (1.514)
Prob (instrumented) 1.104∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0467) (0.0517)
Constant -19.72∗∗∗ -39.51∗ -38.91∗
(2.271) (20.70) (22.98)
N 1780 1780 1600
adj. R2 0.369 0.381 0.373
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: Second Stage with Instruments for
Prob using BL and DF data. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the investor level in
parentheses.
Dep. Variable: Invest (1) (2) (3)
Indirect Effect (CACME) 4.301∗∗∗ 4.305∗∗∗ 4.274∗∗∗
(1.200) (1.190) ( 1.256)
Direct Effects (CADE) 7.212∗∗∗ 7.199∗∗∗ 7.898∗∗∗
(1.602) (1.524) (1.698)
Observations 1780 1780 1600
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
Gender No No Yes
Controls for Treatment Order No Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 14: Indirect (CACME) and Direct Treat-
ment Effects (CADE). Standard errors obtained from
bootstrapping by resampling observations (with re-
placements) for 1,000 times. Bootstrap standard er-
rors in parentheses.
Dep. Variable: Invest (1) (2) (3)
Indirect Effect (CACME) 3.049∗∗∗ 3.039∗∗∗ 3.515∗∗∗
(1.179) (1.187) (1.301)
Direct Effects (CADE) 6.877∗∗∗ 6.875∗∗∗ 6.754∗∗∗
(1.471) (1.392) (1.571)
Observations 1780 1780 1600
Number of Bankers 89 89 80
Gender No No Yes
Controls for Treatment Order No Yes Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Indirect (CACME) and Direct Treat-
ment Effects (CADE). Standard errors obtained from
bootstrapping by resampling observations (with re-
placements) for 1,000 times. Bootstrap standard er-
rors in parentheses.
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D.2 Alternative Specifications
In this section we check how robust the results of Table 5 are to alternative specifications. In of Table
16 we run a linear regression of Investmentb,r on Probb,r and the two different treatments (MA
and DF) along with all of the control variables we use in Table 4. As can be seen, the results of the
regressions in Table 16 are close to those of 5. That is, the effect of instrumented and non-instrumented
beliefs on investments are very similar. Moreover, if we regress the investment (InvestmentRb,gr) of
each Banker b for a given risk gr of the Risk part of each treatment, the results are again very similar
to those of Table 5 (see Table 17).
The similarity in the results of all three specifications makes us confident that our IV approach is the
adequate strategy to decompose the indirect effects of motivated beliefs on the investment decision of
Bankers under limited liability. In this direction, when comparing Tables 16 and 17, it seems like the
treatment effects are larger when the probabilities are exogenously given (i.e., in the Risk part). We
believe that an explanation for such difference is that in the Dot Spot part, a fraction of the treatment
effect is channeled through the motivated beliefsand ends up reflected in the stated probabilities
Probb,r instead of directly on the treatment dummy. Of course, even if part of the treatment effect is
absorbed by the beliefs of the bankers, the effect of Probb,r is smaller than that GivenRisk, since in
the first case there is ambiguity on the outcome of the investment, while in the latter the odds are
known with certainty.
Finally, in Tables 18 and 19 we reproduce Tables 16 and 17, but using a logistic models instead of
linear regressions. Once again, the effect of given probabilities on the investment of bankers is very
close to that of subjective probabilities. Also, the effect of the treatments are larger when the risk
of the investment is given than when the investment has ambiguous odds, supporting again the idea
that part of the treatment effect is absorbed by the formation of motivated beliefs.
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Dep. Var.: Investment (1) (2) (3)
Prob 0.955∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0314) (0.0362)
Treatment(MA) 7.827∗∗∗ 7.834∗∗∗ 8.591∗∗∗
(1.574) (1.576) (1.692)
Treatment(DF) 7.484∗∗∗ 7.488∗∗∗ 7.538∗∗∗
(1.459) (1.461) (1.587)
Raven 0.243 0.190
(0.585) (0.670)
Overestimation 0.315 0.378
(0.351) (0.450)
Overplacement -0.0471 -0.215
(0.363) (0.424)
Overprecision -0.250 -0.175
(0.163) (0.182)
Risk aversion -0.215 -0.0509
(0.544) (0.612)
Loss aversion -0.965∗ -0.995
(0.580) (0.637)
Order 2 0.154 1.297
(3.797) (4.884)
Order 3 -0.731 -0.280
(3.687) (4.673)
Female -2.616
(3.320)
Constant -13.32∗∗∗ -5.681 -5.568
(2.006) (18.49) (20.19)
N 2670 2670 2400
adj. R2 0.602 0.615 0.588
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 16: Regression for Investment on
Stated Probability. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the investor level.
Dep. Var.: InvestmentR (1) (2) (3)
Given Risk 1.023∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0281)
Treatment(MA) 8.869∗∗∗ 8.869∗∗∗ 9.278∗∗∗
(1.126) (1.127) (1.213)
Treatment(DF) 9.811∗∗∗ 9.811∗∗∗ 9.736∗∗∗
(1.149) (1.151) (1.238)
Raven -0.0144 0.256
(0.495) (0.547)
Overestimation 0.156 -0.128
(0.365) (0.280)
Overplacement 0.209 0.396
(0.271) (0.324)
Overprecision -0.138 -0.161
(0.108) (0.123)
Risk aversion -0.219 -0.301
(0.474) (0.520)
Loss aversion -0.849∗ -0.862∗
(0.438) (0.470)
Order 2 -4.767∗ -7.002∗∗
(2.778) (3.426)
Order 3 -2.257 -3.664
(2.489) (3.052)
Female 2.224
(2.687)
Constant -19.48∗∗∗ -4.479 -10.69
(1.459) (15.68) (16.96)
N 2937 2937 2640
adj. R2 0.704 0.713 0.707
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Regression for Investment on
Given Risk. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the investor level.
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Dep. Var.: Investment (1) (2) (3)
Prob 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗
(0.00697) (0.00744) (0.00795)
Treatment(MA) 0.694∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.151) (0.156)
Treatment(DF) 0.549∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.143) (0.151)
Raven -0.113 -0.151∗∗
(0.0729) (0.0734)
Overestimation 0.0138 0.0176
(0.0671) (0.0750)
Overplacement -0.0371 -0.0513
(0.0365) (0.0439)
Overprecision -0.0211 -0.0207
(0.0175) (0.0173)
Risk aversion 0.0731 0.0933
(0.0641) (0.0645)
loss aversion -0.0153 -0.0320
(0.0683) (0.0727)
Order 2 -0.313 0.105
(0.513) (0.569)
Order 3 0.146 0.517
(0.426) (0.481)
Female 0.334
(0.460)
Constant -2.466∗∗∗ 0.515 1.118
(0.366) (2.224) (2.263)
N 2670 2670 2400
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 18: Logit regression for Investment
on Stated Probability. Robust standard
errors clustered at the investor level in
parentheses.
Dep. Var.: InvestmentR (1) (2) (3)
Given Risk 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0829∗∗∗
(0.00627) (0.00708) (0.00730)
Treatment(MA) 0.962∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.161) (0.175)
Treatment(DF) 1.094∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.178) (0.193)
Raven -0.0689 -0.0453
(0.0778) (0.0809)
Overestimation 0.0481 0.00521
(0.0786) (0.0678)
Overplacement 0.0319 0.0574
(0.0427) (0.0453)
Overprecision -0.00607 -0.0158
(0.0158) (0.0166)
Risk Aversion 0.0272 0.0155
(0.0629) (0.0679)
Loss Aversion 0.0154 0.0303
(0.0664) (0.0655)
Order 2 -0.105 -0.222
(0.470) (0.518)
Order 3 0.0774 0.110
(0.412) (0.444)
Female 0.473
(0.400)
Constant -3.325∗∗∗ -1.853 -2.835
(0.354) (2.294) (2.442)
N 2937 2937 2640
Controls No Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Logit regression for Investment
on Given Probability. Robust standard
errors clustered at the investor level in
parentheses.
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E Instructions
These are the instructions for the treatment order Baseline, Matched, Diffusion. The instructions are
translated from German.
Welcome to our Experiment!
During the experiment it is neither allowed to use any electronic devices nor to communicate with
other participants. Please do only use the programs and functions designed for the experiment. Please
do not talk to other participants. Please do not write on the instructions. You will find pen and paper
in front of your computer for additional notes. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We
will then come to you and answer your question. In any case, please do not ask the question out loud.
If the question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat and answer it aloud. If you do not comply
with these rules, we have to exclude you from the experiment and the payoff.
This experiment consists of four blocks. Each block consists of several parts. We will read the
instructions before working on the respective blocks and parts together. At the end of the experiment,
the payoff for the four blocks is disclosed to you.
General Instructions for Block 1
Block 1 consists of two parts. Part 1 has one round, part 2 has ten rounds. The computer
will randomly choose exactly one of these 11 rounds for your payoff whereby each round is chosen
with the same probability. The payoff for block 1 is disclosed at the end of the experiment.
In each round of block 1 you have an initial endowment of 8 euro and decide on the percentage
share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose an arbitrary percentage between
0% and 100%. In order to do so, we provide a scroll bar with which you can state the share of your
endowment you want to invest.
Payoff:
Your amount to be invested is your chosen percentage times 8 euro. The investment can either
succeed or fail.
• If the investment is successful, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 1.75. Hence, you
will additionally gain three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested.
• If the investment fails, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 0. Hence, you will lose
the entire amount to be invested (100%).
You will receive the share of the initial endowment which you do not invest, 8 euro minus the amount
to be invested I, irrespective of whether the investment succeeds or fails.
Example:
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Suppose you decide to invest 60% of your 8 euro. The amount to be invested equals I = 0.6 × 8 euro
= 4.80 euro. The remainder of the initial endowment (3.20 euro) is not invested.
• If the investment succeeds, I = 4.80 is multiplied with 1.75. Hence, you will gain three quarters
(75%) of the amount to be invested. The amount not invested, 3.20 euro, remains in your
possession. Altogether you receive 3.20 euro + 1.75 × 4.80 euro = 11.60 euro.
• If the investment fails, you will lose the amount to be invested I = 4.80. The amount not invested,
3.20 euro, remains in your possession. Altogether you receive 3.20 euro.
These payoffs for successful or failed investments respectively apply for the entire block (part
1 and part 2). The conditions under which the investment is successful, however, differ
among part 1 and part 2.
Specific Instructions for Block 1 Part 1
Part 1 consists of one round with 11 decision situations, summarized in a table (see Table
20). If part 1 is paid off, the computer randomly chooses one of the 11 situations to be executed.
Thereby, each of the 11 situations is chosen with the same probability.
Situation Success probability of the investment Amount to be invested
(Percentage of 8 euro)
1 0% Scroll bar
2 10% Scroll bar
3 20% Scroll bar
4 30% Scroll bar
5 40% Scroll bar
6 50% Scroll bar
7 60% Scroll bar
8 70% Scroll bar
9 80% Scroll bar
10 90% Scroll bar
11 100% Scroll bar
Table 20
In each of the 11 situations, you will be given a success probability of the investment. As you can
see in Table 20, this success probability increases from 0% (in decision situation 1) to 100% (in
decision situation 11) in increments of 10 percentage points.
Please indicate for each of these 11 situations how much of your initial endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest if the respective situation is drawn.
Example:
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Suppose you would have stated, among other things, in Table 20 (using the scroll bar) that you want
to invest 40% of your endowment in decision situation 6 and 70% of your endowment in decision
situation 9.
• If the computer randomly chooses decision situation 6 for the payoff, the investment will be
successful with a probability of 50% (see Table 20) and your amount to be invested equals 40%
× 8 euro = 3.20 euro.
• If the computer randomly chooses decision situation 9 for the payoff, the investment will be
successful with a probability of 80% (see Table 20) and your amount to be invested equals 70%
× 8 euro = 5.60 euro.
In each situation you use a scroll bar to state the percentage of the endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest, if this situation is paid off. As soon as you have made your eleven decisions, please click on
“confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm your entries, you can change the position of the eleven
scroll bars. In order to complete part 1 and to start the next round, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
Specific Instructions for Block 1 Part 2
Part 2 consists of ten rounds. In each round you decide which percentage share of your 8 euro
you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose any arbitrary percentage between 0% and 100%. Your
amount to be invested I equals percentage × 8 euro. Remember: In the end exactly one of the eleven
rounds from both parts of block 1 is randomly chosen for your payoff.
Before each round of part 2, the computer randomly chooses whether or not the invest-
ment will be successful . Before your investment decision you will receive a hint in each round
whether the investment will be successful or fail in this round. This hint consists of a graph
containing a total of of 400 RED and BLUE dots that will be shown to you for 8 seconds.
With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the computer chooses a graph which contains more RED than
BLUE dots. In this case the investment will be successful. With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the
computer chooses a graph which contains more BLUE than RED dots. In this case the investment fails.
If the graph contains more RED than BLUE dots, the investment succeeds with cer-
tainty.
If the graph contains more blue than RED dots, the investment fails with certainty.
By using the scroll bar you state which percentage share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Moreover,
in each round of part 2 you will be asked for your estimation of the probability that there were
more RED than BLUE dots in the preceding graph (hence, you state your estimation of the success
probability of the investment). This statement does not affect your payoff.
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As soon as you made both decisions, please click on “confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm
your entries, you can change the position of the scroll bar and change your opinion on the success
probability. In order to complete a round in part 2 and to continue, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
Summary of Block 1
In block 1 you make investment decisions. The payoffs of a successful or failed investment respectively
are identical for part 1 and part 2:
If the investment is successful, you will gain three quarters (75%) of the amount to be invested. If
the investment fails, you will lose the entire (100%) amount to be invested.
Part 1 and part 2 differ with respect to the conditions under which the investment is successful. In
part 1 the success probability is given in each situation. In part 2 you receive a hint in each round
whether the investment will be successful in this round.
To begin with, you will do three practice rounds for part 1 and five practice rounds for part 2. In
these practice rounds you cannot earn money, they are only there in order to clarify both parts.
After the practice rounds you will do block 1 consisting of one round of part 1 with eleven decision
situations and ten rounds of part 2. Out of these eleven rounds the computer randomly chooses exactly
one round for your actual payoff.
This is the end of the instructions for block 1. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
We will then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the
“Continue” button in order to start with block 1.
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General Instructions for Block 2
Block 2 consists of two parts. Part 1 has one round, part 2 has ten rounds. The computer will
randomly choose exactly one of these eleven rounds for your payoff whereby each round is chosen
with the same probability. The payoff for block 2 is disclosed at the end of the experiment.
In block 2 the computer will randomly choose whether you are type A or type B. This role will
persist throughout all eleven rounds of block 2. On your screens you can see whether you are type A or
type B. Each type A will be assigned to exactly one type B (and each type B will assigned
to exactly one type A). You will neither learn throughout nor after the experiment which type B
is assigned to which type A.
Each type A will make an investment decision in block 2 which can influence his own payoff and
also the payoff of his assigned type B. If you receive the role of type B, your decision will not have
any effects on the payoff.
For all type A the following holds:
In each round of block 2 you have an initial endowment of 8 euro and you decide which percentage
share you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose an arbitrary percentage between 0% and 100%.
In order to do so, we will provide a scroll bar with which you can indicate the percentage share of
your endowment you want to invest.
The amount to be invested is the chosen percentage times 8 euro. The investment can either
be successful or fail.
• If the investment is successful, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 1.75. Hence, you
will gain three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested.
• If the investment fails, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 0.75. Hence, you will lose
one quarter (25%) of the amount to be invested. An amount of three quarters (75%)
of your amount to be invested is subtracted from the endowment of 8 euro of the
type B assigned to you.
You will keep the share of the endowment you do not invest, 8 euro minus the amount to be invested
I, irrespective of whether the investment succeeds or fails.
Example:
Suppose you decide to invest 60% of your 8 euro. Then the amount to be invested equals I = 0.6 × 8
euro = 4.80 euro. The rest of the endowment (3.20 euro) is not invested.
• If the investment is successful, I = 4.80 euro is multiplied by 1.75. Hence, you will gain three
quarters (75%) of the amount to be invested. The amount not invested, 3.20 euro, will remain
in your possession. In total you will receive 3.20 euro + 1.75 × 4.80 euro = 11.60 euro. Type B
is not influenced by your decision and receives 8 euro.
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• If the investment fails, you will lose one quarter of the amount to be invested I = 4.80 (i.e., 1.20
euro). The amount not invested will entirely remain in your possession. In total you will receive
8 euro – 1.20 euro = 6.80 euro. The type B assigned to you loses three quarters of your amount
to be invested, hence, 3.60 euro. Type B, hence, receives 8 euro – 3.60 euro = 4.40 euro.
For all type B the following holds:
In block 2 you have an initial endowment of 8 euro. Your payoff depends on the investment of the
type A assigned to you.
You will make the same decisions as participant of type A. However, all your decisions in block
2 will not affect your payoff. Your payoff of block 2 only depends on the decisions of the type A
assigned to you.
For all type A and B the following holds:
These payoffs for successful or failed investments respectively hold for the entire block 2 (part 1
and part 2). The conditions under which the investment is successful differ between part
1 and part 2.
Specific instructions for Block 2 Part 1
As in block 1, part 1 consists of one round with 11 decision situations, summarized in a table
(see Table 21). If part 1 is paid off, the computer randomly chooses one of the 11 situations to be
executed. Thereby, each of the 11 situations is chosen with the same probability.
Situation Success probability of the investment Amount to be invested
(Percentage of 8 euro)
1 0% Scroll bar
2 10% Scroll bar
3 20% Scroll bar
4 30% Scroll bar
5 40% Scroll bar
6 50% Scroll bar
7 60% Scroll bar
8 70% Scroll bar
9 80% Scroll bar
10 90% Scroll bar
11 100% Scroll bar
Table 21
In each of the 11 situations, you will be given a success probability of the investment. As you can
see in Table 21, this success probability increases from 0% (in decision situation 1) to 100% (in
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decision situation 11) in increments of 10 percentage points.
Please indicate for each of these 11 situations how much of your initial endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest if the respective situation is drawn.
In each situation you use a scroll bar to state the percentage of the endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest, if this situation is paid off. As soon as you have made your eleven decisions, please click on
“confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm your entries, you can change the position of the eleven
scroll bars. In order to complete part 1 and to start the next round, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
Specific instructions for Block 2 Part 2
As in the previous block, part 2 consists of ten rounds. In each round you decide which per-
centage share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose any arbitrary percentage
between 0% and 100%. Your amount to be invested I equals percentage × 8 euro. Remember: In the
end exactly one of the eleven rounds from both parts of block 2 is randomly chosen for your payoff.
As in part 2 of block 1, before each round the computer randomly chooses whether or not the
investment will be successful. Before your investment decision you will receive a hint in each round
which indicates whether the investment will be successful or fail in this round. This hint consists of
a graph containing a total of 400 RED and BLUE dots that will be shown to you for 8 seconds.
With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the computer chooses a graph which contains more RED than
BLUE dots. In this case the investment will be successful. With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the
computer chooses a graph which contains more BLUE than RED dots. In this case the investment fails.
If there are more RED than BLUE dots in the graph, the investment succeeds with
certainty.
If there are more BLUE than RED dots in the graph, the investment fails with cer-
tainty.
By using the scroll bar you state which percentage share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Moreover,
in each round of part 2 you will be asked for your estimation of the probability that there were
more RED than BLUE dots in the preceding graph (hence, you state your estimation of the success
probability of the investment). This statement does not affect your payoff.
As soon as you made both decisions, please click on “confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm
your entries, you can change the position of the scroll bar and change your opinion on the success
probability. In order to complete a round in part 2 and to continue, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
40
Summary of Block 2
In block 2 you make investment decisions. The payoffs of a successful or failed investment respectively
are identical for part 1 and part 2:
For type A it holds for both parts: If the investment is successful, you will gain three quarters (75%)
of the amount to be invested. If the investment fails, you will lose one quarter (25%) of your amount
to be invested. The type B assigned to you will lose three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested.
For type B it holds for both parts: You make the same decisions as participants of type A. However,
your decisions in block 2 do not have any effects on the payoff.
Part 1 and part 2 differ with respect to the conditions under which the investment is successful. In
part 1 the success probability is given in each situation. In part 2 you receive a hint in each round
which indicates whether the investment will be successful in this round.
This is the end of the instructions for block 2. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
We will then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the
“Continue” button in order to start with block 2.
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General Instructions for Block 3
Block 3 consists of two parts. Part 1 has one round, part 2 has ten rounds. The computer will
randomly choose exactly one of these eleven rounds for your payoff whereby each round is chosen
with the same probability. The payoff for block 3 is disclosed at the end of the experiment.
In block 3 you will be the same type (type A or type B) as in block 2. Each type A will make an
investment decision in block 3 which can influence his own payoff and also the payoff of all type B
individuals. If you received the role of type B, your decision will not have any effects on the payoff.
For all type A the following holds:
In each round of block 3 you have an initial endowment of 8 euro and you decide which percentage
share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose an arbitrary percentage between
0% and 100%. In order to do so, we will provide a scroll bar with which you can indicate the
percentage share of your endowment you want to invest.
The amount to be invested is the chosen percentage times 8 euro. Thereby, the investment can
either be successful or fail.
• If the investment is successful, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 1.75. Hence, you
will gain three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested.
• If the investment fails, the amount to be invested is multiplied by 0.75. Hence, you will
lose one quarter (25%) of your amount to be invested. The type B individuals
on aggregate will lose three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested. Thereby,
each type B will bear the same share of the loss in this experiment.
You will keep the share of the endowment you do not invest, 8 euro minus the amount to be invested
I, irrespective of whether the investment succeeds or fails.
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Example:
Suppose you decide to invest 60% of your 8 euro. Then the amount to be invested equals I = 0.6 × 8
euro = 4.80 euro. The rest of the endowment (to the amount of 3.20 euro) is not invested.
• If the investment is successful, I = 4.80 euro is multiplied by 1.75. Hence, you will gain three
quarters (75%) of the amount to be invested. The amount not invested, 3.20 euro, will remain
in your possession. In total you will receive 3.20 euro + 1.75 × 4.80 euro = 11.60 euro. No type
B individual is influenced by your decision.
• If the investment fails, you will lose one quarter of the amount to be invested I = 4.80 (i.e., 1.20
euro). The amount not invested will entirely remain in your possession. In total you will receive
8 euro – 1.20 euro = 6.80 euro. The type B individuals on aggregate lose three quarters (75%)
of your amount to be invested (i.e., 3.60 euro). This loss is shared equally among all type B
individuals. If, for example, 10 type B individuals participate in your experiment, each type B
individual loses 0.36 euro.
For all type B the following holds:
In block 3 you have an initial endowment of 8 euro. Your payoff depends on the investment of the
type A individuals. You will make the same decisions as participants of type A. However, all your
decisions in block 3 will not affect your payoff. Your payoff of block 3 only depends on the decisions
of the type A individuals.
For all type A and B the following holds:
These payoffs for successful or failed investments respectively hold for the entire block 2 (part 1
and part 2). The conditions under which the investment is successful differ between part
1 and part 2.
Specific instructions for Block 3 Part 1
As in both previous blocks, part 1 again consists of one round with 11 decision situations,
summarized in a table (see Table 22). If part 1 is paid off, the computer randomly chooses one of
the 11 situations to be executed. Thereby, each of the 11 situations is chosen with the same probability.
In each of the 11 situations, you will be given a success probability of the investment. As you can
see in Table 22, this success probability increases from 0% (in decision situation 1) to 100% (in
decision situation 11) in increments of 10 percentage points.
Please indicate for each of these 11 situations how much of your initial endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest if the respective situation is drawn.
In each situation you use a scroll bar to state the percentage of the endowment of 8 euro you want
to invest, if this situation is paid off. As soon as you have made your eleven decisions, please click on
“confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm your entries, you can change the position of the eleven
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Situation Success probability of the investment Amount to be invested
(Percentage of 8 euro)
1 0% Scroll bar
2 10% Scroll bar
3 20% Scroll bar
4 30% Scroll bar
5 40% Scroll bar
6 50% Scroll bar
7 60% Scroll bar
8 70% Scroll bar
9 80% Scroll bar
10 90% Scroll bar
11 100% Scroll bar
Table 22
scroll bars. In order to complete part 1 and to start the next round, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
Specific instructions for Block 3 Part 2
As in the previous blocks, part 2 again consists of ten rounds. In each round you decide which
percentage share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Thereby, you can choose any arbitrary percentage
between 0% and 100%. Remember: In the end exactly one of the eleven rounds from both parts of
block 3 is randomly chosen for your payoff.
Before each round in part 2, the computer randomly chooses whether or not the investment
will be successful. Before your investment decision you will receive a hint in each round which
indicates whether the investment will be successful or fail in this round. This hint consists of a
graph containing a total of 400 RED and BLUE dots that will be shown to you for 8 seconds.
With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the computer chooses a graph which contains more RED than
BLUE dots. In this case the investment will be successful. With a probability of 1/2 (hence 50%) the
computer chooses a graph which contains more BLUE than RED dots. In this case the investment fails.
If there are more RED than BLUE dots in the graph, the investment succeeds with
certainty.
If there are more BLUE than RED dots in the graph, the investment fails with cer-
tainty.
By using the scroll bar you state which percentage share of your 8 euro you want to invest. Moreover,
in each round of part 2 you will be asked for your estimation of the probability that there were
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more RED than BLUE dots in the preceding graph (hence, you state your estimation of the success
probability of the investment). This statement does not affect your payoff.
As soon as you made both decisions, please click on “confirm entry”. As long as you did not confirm
your entries, you can change the position of the scroll bar and change your opinion on the success
probability. In order to complete a round in part 2 and to continue, you have to click on “confirm
entry”.
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Summary of Block 3
In block 3 you make investment decisions. The payoffs of a successful or failed investment respectively
are identical for part 1 and part 2:
For type A it holds for both parts:
If the investment is successful, you will gain three quarters (75%) of the amount to be invested.
If the investment fails, you will lose one quarter (25%) of your amount to be invested. The type B
individuals on aggregate will lose three quarters (75%) of your amount to be invested. Thereby, each
type B will bear the same share of the loss in this experiment.
For type B it holds for both parts:
You make the same decisions as participants of type A. However, your decisions in block 3 do not
have any effects on the payoff.
Part 1 and part 2 differ with respect to the conditions under which the investment is successful. In
part 1 the success probability is given in each situation. In part 2 you receive a hint in each round
which indicates whether the investment will be successful in this round.
This is the end of the instructions for block 3. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
We will then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the
“Continue” button in order to start with block 3.
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General Instructions for Block 4
Block 4 consists of four parts. We will read the specific instructions for each part together directly
before the respective part.
Specific Instructions for Block 4 Part 1
In this part you will solve 36 exercises. These 36 exercises will be split on three pages such that
there will be twelve exercises on each page.
All exercises follow the same structure as shown in Figure 8. There are three rows and three columns
with geometric patterns and the element on the bottom right is missing. Your task is to choose the
element among eight given elements which fits best to the other patterns. Only one of the eight
elements given is correct.
Figure 8
You choose the element using a drop-down list (see Figure 9). You will find this drop-down list
on the left below each task. In order to complete the 12 tasks of each page, you can arbitrarily scroll
up or down. You do not have to answer the tasks in the specified order. For all three pages you
have 5 minutes each. If the time is up for one page, the computer registers all your answers and
you will receive 0.10 euro for each correct answer. At the end of the experiment you will learn how
many tasks you solved correctly. You can of course click on “continue” before the expiration of the 5
minutes. However, in this case you cannot return to this page anymore.
This is the end of the instructions for part 1. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will
then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the “Continue”
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Figure 9
button in order to answer the questions.
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Specific Instructions for Block 4 Part 2
In part 2 you will be asked two questions regarding part 1.
Question 1: What do you think, how many exercises did you solve correctly in the previous part?
Here you indicate, in how many of the exercises of the previous part (block 4, part 1) you have chosen
the correct element in your opinion. Remember: in part 1 there were three pages with 12 exercises
each, hence, in total 36 exercises. You can type in every number from 0 to 36.
Question 2: What do you think, how many participants have solved less exercises correctly than you
in the previous part?
Here you indicate, how many of the present 20 participants in your opinion have chosen less often
the correct element than you in part 1. You can type in every number from 0 to 19.
Payoff:
For both questions your payoff depends on the precision of your answer. The lower the distance
between your answer and the correct answer to a question, the larger your payoff. The payoff for one
question equals e2 - e0.15 × distance. If the payoff should be smaller than zero euro, you will
receive zero euro instead. Hence, you cannot incur any losses in part 2.
Example Question 1:
Suppose the answer to Question 1 regarding your number of correctly solved exercises is 10 and in
fact you have solved 12 exercises correctly. Then the distance equals 2. Your payoff for Question 1 is
thus e2 - e0.15 × 2 = e1.70.
Example Question 2:
Suppose the answer to Question 2 is 11 and in fact 12 participants have solved less exercises correctly
than you. Then the distance equals 1. Your payoff for question 2 is thus e2 - e0.15 × 1 = e1.85.
The computer will randomly choose exactly one of both questions of part 2 for your payoff. You
will learn about your payoff for part 2 at the end of the experiment.
Question 1 will appear first. As soon as you have answered Question 1, please click on “confirm
entry”. Afterwards, question 2 appears. As soon as you have answered Question 2, please again click
on “confirm entry” in order to complete part 2 and to start with the next part.
This is the end of the instructions for part 2. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will
then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the “Continue”
button in order to answer the questions.
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Specific instructions for Block 4 Part 3
Part 3 consists of 10 rounds. In each round a new graphic consisting of a total of 400 dots will be
shown to you. In each graphic there are between 0 an 400 RED dots and all the other dots are BLUE.
Each graphic is shown to you for 8 seconds and completely disappears from your screen afterwards.
Afterwards, you will make two estimations.
Estimation 1: How many RED dots were in the graphic?
Estimation 2: How large is the difference between your Estimation 1 and the actual number of
RED dots?
In Estimation 1 you indicate your estimate about how many RED dots were in the graphic shown
to you. In Estimation 2 you indicate your estimate about how far your Estimation 1 is off the
actual number of RED dots in the graphic.
Example:
Suppose you estimate that there were 211 RED dots in the graphic. Hence, your estimate 1 is 211.
Suppose you think that your Estimation 1 deviates by 24 in expected values from the actual number
of RED dots. Hence, your Estimation 2 is 24.
Payoff:
For both questions your payoff depends on the precision of your answer. The smaller the absolute
distance of your answer to the correct answer of an estimation, the higher your payoff. The payoff
for an estimation equals e5 - e0.05 × absolute distance. If this payoff should be smaller than
zero, you will receive zero euro instead. Hence, you cannot make any losses in part 3.
Example for Estimation 1:
Suppose your estimation about the number of RED dots is 211 and the actual number of RED dots
is 180. Then, the absolute distance equals 211 - 180 = 31. Hence, the payoff for Estimation 1 is e5 -
e0.05 × 31 = e3.45.
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Example for Estimation 2:
Suppose you estimated that the distance of your Estimation 1 to the actual number of RED dots
equals 24 in expected values and therefore indicated 24 as Estimation 2. In fact, your estimation error
in Estimation 1 was 31. Therefore, the distance between your Estimation 2 and the correct answer
equals: 31 - 24 = 7. Hence, the payoff for Estimation 2 is e5 - e0.05 × 7 = e4.65.
Your payoff for part 3 is determined by the computer randomly choosing exactly one of both
estimations from one of the ten rounds of part 3. You will learn about your payoff at the end of
the experiment.
Please click on “confirm entry” in each round as soon as you have entered Estimation 1 as well as
Estimation 2.
This is the end of the instructions for part 3. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will
then come to you and answer quietly. If you do not have any questions, please click on the “Continue”
button in order to start with the 10 rounds of part 3.
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Specific instructions for Block 4 Part 4
In this part we will subsequently present you two tables with 15 rows each. In both tables, Table
23 and Table 24, you have to choose between lotteries and a safe amount. At the end of the
experiment the computer randomly chooses one row from one of both tables for your payoff with
an equal probability. Both tables are chosen with a probability of 50 percent and each row within a
table has the same probability to be chosen.
Table 23:
In the lotteries of Table 23 you will win a positive amount in addition to your previously achieved
credit with a probability of 50% and with a probability of 50% your credit will remain unchanged.
As you can infer from Table 23, the lottery becomes more unattractive the lower the row. In
row 1 there is a 50 percent chance that you gain e8.00. In row 2, in contrast, there is a 50 percent
chance, that you gain e7.50. Your task is to decide until which row you prefer the lottery
over a safe payment of e2.50.
Example (see Table 23): Suppose that you prefer the lottery over the safe amount of e2.50 as soon
as the lottery increases your credit by at least e4.50 in the case of success. In this case you choose
row 8 in Table 23. This means that you receive the safe payment of e2.50 if the computer randomly
chooses one of the rows 9 to 15. If the computer randomly chooses one of the rows 1 to 8, your payoff
is decided upon by the lottery given in the chosen row. Hence, if the computer chooses, for example,
row 5, you will gain e6 in addition to your previous credit with a probability of 50% and with a
probability of 50% your credit remains unchanged.
Table 24:
In the lotteries of Table 24 you will win 5 euro in addition to your previously achieved credit with a
probability of 50% and with a probability of 50% a given amount will be deducted from your previous
credit.
As you can infer from Table 24, the lottery becomes more unattractive the lower the row. In
row 1 there is a 50 percent chance that you lose e0.50 of your previous credit. In row 2, in contrast,
there is a 50 percent chance, that you lose e1.00 of your previous credit. Your task is to decide
until which row you prefer the lottery over a safe payment to the amount of e0.
Example (see Table 24): Suppose that you prefer the lottery over the safe amount of 0e as long as
the lottery decreases your credit by at most e3.50 in the case of a loss. In this case you choose row
7 in Table 24. This means that you receive the safe payment to the amount of e0 if the computer
randomly chooses one of the rows 8 to 15. If the computer randomly chooses one of the rows 1 to 7,
your payoff is decided upon by the lottery given in the chosen row. Hence, if the computer chooses,
for example, row 3, you will gain e5 in addition to your previous credit with a probability of 50%
and with a probability of 50% you will lose e1.50 of your previous credit.
52
Table 23
Note that the computer randomly chooses exactly one row from one of both tables with an equal
probability for your payoff. At the end of the experiment you will learn which table and row has been
chosen randomly by the computer. If you have chosen the lottery in the row chosen by the computer,
you will additionally learn the outcome of the lottery.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will then come to you and answer quietly. If
prompted, please click on the “continue” button in order to continue.
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Table 24
This is the last part of the experiment. After the experiments ends, there will be a short questionnaire.
Thank you for your participation!
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